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Issue

Has Galvan

failed t0 establish the district court

abused

its

discretion

by imposing a uniﬁed

10-year sentence with ﬁve years ﬁxed, and retaining jurisdiction, upon Galvan’s guilty plea t0

aggravated driving under the inﬂuence?

Galvan Has Failed T0 Establish The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Galvan, while driving under the inﬂuence 0f Xanax, struck a car from behind, seriously
injuring the driver,

Douglas Stander. (12/17/1 8

to the presentence report,

Tr., p.9,

Mr. Stander “was treated

heart, as well as several lacerations

L.17 — p. 10, L6; PSI, pp.1,

at the hospital for

4.)

According

a fractured sternum, a bruised

and abrasions.” (PSI, p3.) The

state

charged Galvan with

aggravated driving under the inﬂuence. (R., pp.52-54.) Galvan pled guilty and the

district court

imposed a uniﬁed 10-year sentence with ﬁve years ﬁxed, and retained jurisdiction

for

(R.,

one year.

pp.269-270, 285-288.) Galvan ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal from the judgment. (R., pp.291-

303.)

On appeal, Galvan asserts his sentence is excessive.
0f his argument, Galvan

cites, as

acceptance 0f responsibility

agreement t0 pay

for,

mitigating factors, (1) this

is

his ﬁrst felony conviction, (2) his

and remorse over, the accident and the Victim’s

and

restitution,

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.3-6.) In support

(4) his struggles

depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,

ADHD

injuries, (3) his

With severe mental health problems (major

disorder,

and bipolar disorder).

(Id.,

pp.4-5.)

Despite such mitigating factors, the record supports the sentence imposed.

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

presumed the ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement.

M,

144 Idaho

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391 (citing State V. Trevino,

132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence
bears the burden of demonstrating

it is

will be the defendant's

is

within statutory limits, the appellant

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,

T0

577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, the appellant must show the sentence

any reasonable View 0f the

facts.

Ba_ker,

136 Idaho

at 577,

38 P.3d

is

at 615.

excessive under

A

sentence

is

reasonable, however, if it appears necessary t0 achieve the primary objective 0f protecting society
0r any 0f the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation 0r retribution.
protection of society

is,

and must always be, the ultimate goal of any sentence. State

V.

Li

The

Moore, 78

Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956). Accordingly, appellate courts must take into account
“the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 0f the public interest.”

State V. Hopper, 119 Idaho 606, 608,

The maximum penalty

809 P.2d 467, 469 (1991); see also LC. §19-2521.

for aggravated driving under the inﬂuence

is

15 years.

LC.

§ 18-

8006. The district court imposed an underlying uniﬁed sentence of 10 years With ﬁve years ﬁxed,

Which

falls

well Within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.285-288.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr.

Stander outlined the injuries (and the attendant medical issues) he suffered as a result of Galvan’s
offense:

on

ﬁve broken

his lungs, a

ribs,

a concussion, bleeding inside his chest, severe contusions and swelling

buckled sternum that was broken in two places, a dislocated shoulder, a shredded

shoulder tendon that had to be removed, severe bruising

were broken and chipped, and glass
p.1

1,

that

was embedded

all

over his body, numerous teeth that

in his hand.

(See generally 4/1/19 Tr.,

L.16 — p.23, L.6.)
After Mr. Stander

made

his statement, the district court applied the four sentencing factors

and sentenced Galvan as follows:

The number one

factor I'm required t0 take into account

And Mr.

is

the protection 0f

you d0 have some mental
health issues, you have some substance abuse issues, but you tend to self—medicate
your problems With illegal drugs. You were 0n XanaX that day unprescribed, and
as a result of that you were impaired, and as a result of that you caused this serious
accident. And that's a serious event that caused signiﬁcant injuries and damages.
And my job — one of my jobs is t0 d0 What I can to protect the community from
the community.

that

And

happening again.

deterrence. That
t0 you, but to

is,

Galvan, the reality here

is

that

related t0 that particular issue

what sentence should

I

impose

else in similar circumstances?

anybody

is

that sends a

Should

the question of

message, not only
What should I d0

I --

relative t0 that?

And

then, of course, there

is

They're crimes against society, and there's

taken into account.

.

.

.

Crimes are crimes.
a punishment element that has t0 be

a punishment factor.

Ultimately

we have

an aggravated DUI.

But

it

is

.

.

a serious crime with signiﬁcant resulting injuries.

It's

.

a serious crime, and there are serious consequences t0 be

And I appreciate the fact, Mr.

Galvan, that you are expressing remorse
and some accountability for that. That doesn't always happen, so I d0 appreciate
the fact that you've done that today. That means something. I don't know if it
means anything to Mr. Stander yet, but ultimately it means something in terms 0f
experienced.

my analysis.

what I’m going to do. I’m going to impose a uniﬁed sentence
of ten years With ﬁve ﬁxed and ﬁve indeterminate. However, I’m going to retain
jurisdiction for 365 days. I’m going t0 send you 0n a rider which, over the course
0f the next six or seven months, will impose some treatment while in prison, and
then I’ll get a report and they’ll tell me What they think should happen relative t0
.

.

.

So

this is

you.

T0 be honest With
Galvan.

I

you,

I’ll

give you a

seriously considered just putting

you

—

I’ll

be as candid as

in prison.

This

is

I

can, Mr.

a serious case.

But I’m going to do a rider because you’re a young man. You’ve got some
problems. These behaviors are serious, but by the same token, the rider will give
me a better assessment as t0 What I should really d0 With you going forward.
(4/1/19 Tr., p.27, L.24

— p.33,

L.2.)

Based 0n the above, the
its

decision and also set forth

Galvan has

failed t0 establish

its

district court articulated the correct legal

standards applicable t0

reasons for imposing Galvan’s sentence. The state submits that

an abuse 0f discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm Galvan’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 2nd day 0f December, 2019.
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